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Abstract
We consider the product line strategies of duopolistic rms, each of which can
supply two vertically-di¤erentiated products under nonnegative output constraints
and expectations of their rivals product line reaction. Considering a game of rms
with heterogeneous (homogeneous) unit costs for high- (low-) quality products, we
derive the equilibria for the game and conduct comparative statics of the equilibria
outcomes on the relative superiority of the high-quality product and relative cost
e¢ ciency. In two of the equilibria, we nd that where the cost-ine¢ cient rm
supplies a high-quality good, social welfare can worsen as its unit cost decreases. We
also characterize the result using the production substitution of di¤erentiated goods
within a rm and the high-quality good between rms. Further, by comparing social
welfare in the rst-best equilibria with those in the Cournot duopoly equilibria, we
nd that the social welfare of the market worsens in the multiproduct Cournot
duopoly equilibria as the relative superiority of the high-quality good increases.
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1 Introduction
Real-world economies often include oligopolistic competition in the one market segment
in which rms supply multiple vertically-di¤erentiated products. In the mobile phone
market, for example, Apple supplies iPhone X to the rst line segment and Samsung
competes by supplying its Galaxy S9 to businesses. In the second line segment, Apple
supplies iPhone 8 and Samsung responds with the Galaxy S8. However, despite obvi-
ous interest, there are few studies of oligopolistic competition in these markets in the
economics literature.
Yet another example involves the di¤usion line markets in fashion brands or the fast-
fashion brands of clothing and apparel companies. A di¤usion line is a secondary line
of merchandise created by a high-end fashion house or designer that retails at lower
prices, with many clothing and apparel companies adopting a di¤usion strategy. For
example, the fashion brand Armani supplies high-end customers with its products labelled
as Armaniin its rst line and low-end young customers with its products branded as
Armani Exchangein its second line. Likewise, Prada supplies high-end customers with
its Pradabrand in the rst line and low-end customers with its Miu Miubrand in the
second line. These clothing and apparel companies often supply vertically-di¤erentiated
multiproducts in their markets.
In the existing literature on vertical product di¤erentiation, the quality of the goods
rms produce is treated as an endogenous variable. For instance, in Bonanno (1986)
and Motta (1993), rms initially choose the level of quality and then compete in a
Cournot or Bertrand fashion in an oligopolistic market. Elsewhere, Shaked and Sutton
(1987) consider a two-stage game model in which each of the horizontally- and vertically-
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di¤erentiated multiproduct rms pays a xed sunk cost for R&D or advertising expendi-
ture to improve (the perceived) quality of its products in the rst stage, and then chooses
its respective prices in the second.
In terms of a horizontally-di¤erentiated multiproduct model, Bental and Spiegel (1984)
consider an optimal set of product varieties in a monopoly and analyze the relationship
between the degree of di¤erentiation between any two varieties and the variety price,
or the cost of installing an additional variety. Shaked and Sutton (1990) consider a
two-stage price game model in which each of the horizontally-di¤erentiated multiproduct
rms (potential entrants) selects in the rst stage which product(s) it will produce, and
then incurs a sunk cost for each product entered and chooses its respective prices in
the second. They then graphically characterize the market structure at equilibria using
two parameters to measure the expansion and competition e¤ects.
However, none of these studies considers the case where rms sell multiple products
di¤erentiated in terms of quality (vertically) in the same market. The one closely related
to the present study is Ellison (2005), who analyzes a market where each rm sells high-
and low-end versions of the same product. Although each rm produces two di¤erentiated
goods, they are sold in di¤erent markets each with di¤erent types of consumers.
In markets where rms supply multiple vertically-di¤erentiated products, they some-
times compete with rivals that supply one or some vertically-di¤erentiated products (i.e.,
the rival chooses a single product line) to the same market segment. For this reason,
Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a) consider the competition between two rms where each
can choose a product line of two vertically-di¤erentiated products in the same market
segment. However, few previous studies have addressed an oligopolistic market where
multiproduct rms produce multiple goods di¤erentiated in terms of quality (see, for
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example Johnson and Myatt 2003).1
According to Johnson and Myatt (2003), rms that sell multiple quality-di¤erentiated
products frequently change their product lines when a competitor enters the market. They
then provide an explanation for the common strategies of using ghting brands and
pruningproduct lines. In particular, Johnson and Myatt (2003) endogenize not only
the level of quality of each good, but also the number of goods that each rm supplies to
the market.
Unlike most extant studies, in our model here and in Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a)
both the quality level and the number of di¤erentiated goods that each rm supplies are
exogenously given. We also do not explicitly consider the stage of product line choice
with a xed sunk costas in Shaked and Sutton (1987, 1990). This setting seems appro-
priate to explore the relationship between the production substitution and the di¤erence
in the potential value of the goods according to consumers or the unit costs of the two
goods. The results of the present paper results also relate to those of marketing stud-
ies on product segmentation and product distribution strategies. For instance, Calzada
and Valletti (2012) consider a model of lm distribution and consumption involving a
lm studio that can release two versions of the one lm one for theaters and the other
for video (however, they do not consider oligopolistic competition between lm studios).
They show that the optimal strategy for the studio is to introduce versioning (the si-
multaneous release of a lm with one version for theaters and another for video) if their
goods are not close substitutes for each other.
In our earlier work (Kitamura and Shinkai 2015a), we considered a game that in-
cludes heterogeneous unit production costs between rms for high-quality products, but
1For the sake of simplicity, in this paper, we focus on a duopoly model.
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homogeneous costs for low-quality products. We then described the rmsproduct line
strategies using the relative quality of these products and the cost e¢ ciency ratios of
the rms for the high-quality good. We rst derived equilibria by assuming that, in any
equilibrium, each rival rm chooses positive outputs for both the high- and low-quality
good. Consequently, these equilibria are included cases in which a rm chooses negative
outputs for one of the goods for some parameter range (the relative quality ratio or cost
ine¢ ciency ratio for the high-quality good). We then retroactively excluded the ranges
of parameters in equilibria that result in any negative outputs and graphically describe
the rmsproduct line strategies based on the relative quality of the products and the
cost e¢ ciency ratios between the rms in the case of high-quality goods.
Nonetheless, in our earlier work (Kitamura and Shinkai 2015a), we did not describe
the rms equilibrium prots and equilibrium welfare, although we also established a
result that indirectly supports that in Calzada and Valletti (2012). In their model,
versioning and sequencing correspond to the simultaneous supply and sequential
supply, respectively, of high- and low-quality goods, as in our model. In the case of
sequential supply, the lm studio supplies a high-quality lm version to theaters and
then launches a low-quality DVD version in the same market.
While our previous study (Kitamura and Shinkai 2015a) assumed that each rival rm
chooses positive outputs for both goods in duopolistic competition, it is crucial that each
rm considers its rivalsproduct line strategies when selecting its own strategy. In these
cases, it is important that each rm picks its own product line strategies for multiple
products, given their expectations of the rivals product line reactions. Therefore, in the
present study, we consider the product line strategies of duopolistic rms where each
supply two vertically-di¤erentiated products under nonnegative output constraints, and
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with an expectation of their rivals product line reactions. This di¤erentiates this study
from our previous work (Kitamura and Shinkai 2015a) in many ways.
First, in this analysis, we explicitly examine the product line strategies of duopolistic
rms supplying two vertically-di¤erentiated products under a nonnegative output con-
straint and an expectation regarding the rivals product line reactions. We demonstrate
that there are ve nontrivial equilibria with positive outputs for one or both products and
that both rms have positive prots in each equilibrium. In these equilibria, the ranges
of the two ratio parameters for which positive equilibrium outputs exist for the two rms
di¤er. We then graphically describe the rmsproduct line strategies in equilibrium,
based on the relative quality of the products and each rms relative cost e¢ ciency for
the high-quality good (Figure 1).
Second, at every one of the nontrivial equilibria, by comparing the equilibrium total
outputs and prots of the two rms, we graphically describe the di¤erences between the
two rmstotal outputs and prots in the ve equilibria, based on the relative product
quality and their relative cost e¢ ciency ratios. We then conduct a comparative statics
analysis on these two ratio parameters (Figure 2)2.
Third, we also derive social welfare in every equilibrium. In addition, in a multiproduct
Cournot duopoly, there exist two equilibria in which a reduction of the relative marginal
cost ine¢ ciency decreases social welfare. In both of these (which we derive in cases C
and E), the result that we derive is similar to that in Lahiri and Ono (1988) for a single-
product Cournot oligopoly. Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that a cost reduction in a rm
with a su¢ ciently low market share decreases social welfare, but that a cost reduction in
2Professor John Sutton suggested this to us in his comment during our presentation of an earlier
version of this paper (Shinkai and Kitamura 2015b) at the 2015 Annual Conference of the European
Association for Research Industrial Economics in Munich, Germany. His comment and suggestion has
much improved our analysis, and we therefore wish to express our gratitude.
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any rm always increases social welfare if the market share is the same among all rms.
We identify two equilibria in which a reduction of the relative marginal cost ine¢ ciency
decreases social welfare, when the equilibrium market share of the ine¢ cient rm in the
production of the high-quality good is low (cases C and E in equilibrium in Figures 1 and
3, respectively).
Through comparative statics based on the rms relative cost ine¢ ciency ratio for the
high-quality good, we also nd that a direct production substitution quantity between
the high- and low-quality goods takes place within the ine¢ cient rm. This is when
production of the high-quality good exceeds an indirect production substitution quantity
in the e¢ cient rm through the strategic substitution between the cost-e¢ cient and cost-
ine¢ cient rm for both goods. That is, we extend the analysis in Lahiri and Ono (1988)
to a vertically-di¤erentiated multiproduct duopoly.
However, the mechanism underpinning our result di¤ers from that in Lahiri and Ono
(1988). In sum, our result derives from the production substitution from the high- to
the low-quality good within the cost-ine¢ cient rm and the subsequent production sub-
stitution of good H between rms by means of a strategic substitute . This is because
we consider a duopoly model in which each of the rms can produce two vertically -
di¤erentiated goods if it wishes. However, Lahiri and Onos (1988) result is only caused
by the production substitution between the cost-e¢ cient and cost-ine¢ cient rm, as the
cost of the ine¢ cient rm decreases.
Furthermore, we derive the rst-best equilibria in which the social planner can select
the quantities of all goods for maximizing social welfare under nonnegative constraints
for the output of goods. Then, when we compare the social surpluses in the rst-best
equilibria with those in the Cournot duopoly equilibria derived earlier, we show that the
social welfare of the market worsens in the multiproduct Cournot duopoly equilibria as
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the relative superiority of the high-quality good increases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In
Section 3, we derive the duopoly equilibria with two vertically-di¤erentiated products in
the same market under a nonnegative output constraint and an expectation with regard
to the rival product line reactions. We then graphically describe the rmsproduct line
strategies in equilibrium based on the relative quality of the di¤erentiated products and
the rms relative cost e¢ ciency of the high-quality good (Figure 1). By comparing the
total prots of the two rms at every equilibrium, we graphically describe the di¤erences
between the rmstotal outputs and the prots in the ve equilibria based on the relative
product quality and their relative cost e¢ ciency ratios.
In Section 3, we conduct comparative statics of these two ratio parameters (Figure
2), and in Section 4, we derive the social welfare for every equilibrium derived in Section
2. We then conduct comparative statics based on the relative product quality and the
rms relative cost ine¢ ciency ratio for the high-quality good (Figure 3). In addition,
we derive the rst-best equilibrium, in which the social planner can choose the quantities
of all goods for maximizing social welfare under nonnegative output constraints for the
goods, and compare the social surplus in the rst-best equilibria with those in the Cournot
duopoly equilibria. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 The Model and the Game Equilibria
Suppose there are two rms (i = 1; 2) in a duopoly, each of which produces two goods
(H and L), which di¤er in terms of quality. We assume a continuum of consumers,
represented by a taste parameter, , which is uniformly distributed between 0 and r
(> 0), with a density of one. We further assume that a consumer is of type  2 [0; r]; for
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r > 0. The consumerspreferences are the standard Mussa and Rosen preferences. Thus,
the utility (net benet) of consumer  who buys good  (= H;L) from rm i (= 1; 2) is
given by
Ui() = V   pi i =; 1; 2  = H;L: (1)
To maximize their own surplus, each consumer decides whether to buy nothing or one
unit of good  from rm i.
Let VH and VL denote the quality of the high- and the low-quality goods, respectively.
Then, the maximum amount that consumers are willing to pay for each good is assumed
to be VH = VL =  > VL = 1. Thus, for simplicity, we normalize the quality of the
low-quality good by setting VL = 1 and assume that the quality of the high-quality good
is  times that of the low-quality good.
Note that the consumerspreferences and the utility of each consumer never changes
when the quality of both products change exogenously.
Good  (= H;L) is assumed to be homogeneous for all consumers. Suppose that
there always exists a consumer iL; i = 1; 2 who is indi¤erent between purchasing good
L and purchasing nothing in a monopoly or a duopoly. For this consumer, iL satises
UiL(L) = 0
, iL =
piL
VL
= piL; i = 1; 2. (2)
We can derive the demand for good H as QH = r   b, and that for good L as
QL = b   iL, as shown in Figure 1, where Q = qi + qj, for  = H;L and j = 1; 2:
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Without loss of generality, we set r = 1. Here, b, the threshold between the demand for
H and that for L, is given by
b = (pH   pL)=(  1): (3)
Then, as in Kitamura and Shinkai (2015a), we derive the following inverse demand
functions:
8>><>>:
pH = VH(1 QH) QL = (1 QH) QL
pL = VL  QH  QL = 1 QH  QL,
(4)
where Q = qi + qj and p and qi denote the price of good  and rm is output
of good , respectively, for  = H;L and i; j = 1; 2.
Moreover, suppose that each rm has constant returns to scale and that ciH > ciL =
cjL = cL = 0, where ci is rm is marginal and average cost for good . This implies
that a high-quality good incurs a higher cost of production than does a low-quality good.
Here, without loss of generality, we assume c2H > c1H = 1 > ciL = 0, which means that
rm 1 is more e¢ cient than rm 2. Under these assumptions, each rms prot is dened
in the following manner:
i = (pH   ciH)qiH + pLqiL i = 1; 2: (5)
Firm i(= 1; 2) chooses the outputs for H and L to maximize its prot function in
Cournot fashion under nonnegative output constraints, provided that rm j(6= i) chooses
any given product line strategy sj2 Sj  f(0; 0); (+; 0); (0;+); (+;+)g, where (0; 0) im-
plies (qjH = 0; qjL = 0), (+; 0) implies (qjH > 0; qjL = 0), and so on. Thus, for any given
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sj2 Sj
max
qiH ;qiL
i = f(1  qiH   qjH)  qiL   qjL   ciH)qiH + (1  qiH   qjH   qiL   qjL)qiL (6)
s:t: qiH  0; qiL  0; i 6= j; i; j = 1; 2.
The necessary and complementary conditions for this maximization problem are
@i
@qiH
 0; @i
@qiL
 0; (7)
qiH  @i
@qiH
= qiL  @i
@qiL
= 0; (8)
qiH  0; qiL  0, i = 1; 2. (9)
Each rm chooses its product line strategy for the two vertically- di¤erentiated prod-
ucts; that is, whether to produce positive (zero) quantities of product H and L, given
the rival rms product line strategy.
Note that each inequality @i=@qi  0 in (7) and the corresponding complementary
slackness condition qi  @i=@qi = 0 in (8) imply that if the marginal revenue of rm
i for product (= H;L) is below (the same as) its marginal cost, then rm i does not
produce (does produce) a positive quantity of the product.
In the following, we present the equilibria of a Cournot duopoly game, in which
each rm can choose its product line and outputs for the two vertically-di¤erentiated
goods. The rms operate under a nonnegative output constraint. After presenting the
11
equilibrium, we describe the rmsproduct line strategies based on the productsrelative
quality and the rms relative cost e¢ ciency with respect to the high-quality good in
equilibrium.
There are 15 cases to be solved based on each rms product line strategies, given
the rms expectation of its rivals product line strategies, except for the trivial case in
which neither rm produces H or L. After performing lengthy calculations and checking
the nonnegative constraints for the outputs in each equilibrium, we nd that 10 of the
15 cases have no equilibrium in the corresponding games. Owing to space limitations,
we omit these calculations and the proofs of our results. Thus, we examine the following
ve cases:
 Case A: s1 = (0;+); s2 = (0;+)
In this case, a duopoly market for the low-quality good is realized in equilibrium:
(qA1H ; q
A
1L ; q
A
2H ; q
A
2L ) =

0;
1
3
; 0;
1
3

if 1 <   2, (10)
where the last inequality must hold because of the necessary condition. In Figure
2, area A corresponds to this case. The relative superiority of the high-quality
product H;, is too small compared with the rms relative cost e¢ ciency of the
high-quality good, c2H . Therefore, neither rm produces product H; instead, each
rm produces only the low-quality product L.
From (4), (5), and (10), each rms equilibrium price and prot are
(pAH ; p
A
L ) =

3  2
3
;
1
3

(11)
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(A1 ; 
A
2 ) =

1
9
;
1
9

: (12)
 Case B: s1 = (+; 0); s2 = (0;+)
In this case, each rm specializes in the product that is more cost-e¢ cient for the
rm. Thus, we obtain
(qB1H ; q
B
1L ; q
B
2H ; q
B
2L ) =

2  3
4  1 ; 0; 0;
+ 1
4  1

(13)
if 4    1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4); (14)
where the last inequality must hold, given the necessary condition. In Figure 1,
area B corresponds to this case. In area B, the relative cost ine¢ ciency of the high-
quality good of rm 2, c2H , is relatively strong compared with , the relative quality
superiority of the high-quality product H: From (4), (5), and (10), we obtain the
corresponding equilibrium price and prot of each rm:
(pBH ; p
B
L ) =

(+ 1) (2  1)
4  1 ;
+ 1
4  1

(15)
(B1 ; 
B
2 ) =
 
 (2  3)2
(4  1)2 ;
(+ 1)2
(4  1)2
!
. (16)
We also nd that qB1H   qB2L =  44 1  0, qB1H  qB2L and that
B1   B2 =
1
4  1
 
2   3+ 1 > 0 for 1
2
p
5 +
3
2
< 4 < . (17)
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 Case C: s1 = (+; 0); s2 = (+;+)
In case C, rm 2 (which has a higher unit cost for the high-quality product H)
produces both products, but rm 1, which is e¢ cient in the production of product
H, specializes in product H:
(qC1H ; q
C
1L ; q
C
2H ; q
C
2L ) =

+ c2H   2
3
; 0;
22 + (1  4)c2H   2
6(  1) ;
c2H
2(  1)

(18)
where
qC1H > q
C
2H ; q
C
2L > 0 and q
C
2H R qC2L ,
1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) S , (19)
and
1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < , qC2H > 0 (20)
hold. Furthermore, we obtain
c2H  2 and  > 4. (21)
For qC1H > 0, the inequality  > 2  c2H holds because c2H  2. In Figure 1, areas
C.1 and C.2 correspond to this case. In area C.1, the quality superiority  of the
high-quality product is high compared with the relative cost ine¢ ciency, c2H , of
the high-quality good for rm 2. Moving from area C.1 to area C.2, the relative
quality superiority  decreases and becomes small compared with the relative cost
ine¢ ciency, c2H , of good H for rm 2. Hence, rm 2 substitutes the production of
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high-quality good H for that of low-quality good L. The corresponding equilibrium
price and prot for each rm are
(pCH ; p
C
L ) =

+ c2H + 1
3
;
2  c2H + 2
6

; (22)
C1 =
(+ c2H   2)2
9
;
C2 =
43   4(4c2H   1)2 + 4(2c2H   1)(2c2H + 1)  (7c2H   2) (c2H   2)
36(  1) . (23)
C =
1
12(  1)(4(c2H   1)(2  c2H   3) + (c2H + 2)(c2H   2)): (24)
When 1
2
(2c2H+
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < ; c2H  2, we see thatC = C1  C2 > 0.
 Case D: s1 = (+;+); s2 = (0;+)
In this case, and in contrast to case C, rm 1 is e¢ cient in producing product H
and supplies both products. However, the ine¢ cient rm 2 specializes in product
L.
(qD1H ; q
D
1L ; q
D
2H ; q
D
2L ) =

  2
2(  1) ;
4  
6(  1) ; 0;
1
3

if 2 <  < 4 and   2c2H :
(25)
where the last inequalities must hold given both the positive output condition and
the necessary condition.
In addition, we have qD1L R qD1H ,  Q 5=2. Areas D.1 and D.2 correspond to
15
this case. The relative superiority, , of the high-quality good is relatively small
compared with the relative cost ine¢ ciency, c2H , of the high-quality good for rm
2, especially in case D.2.
From (4), (5), and (10), the corresponding equilibrium price and prot for each rm
are
(pDH ; p
D
L ) =

3+ 2
6
;
1
3

(26)
(D1 ; 
D
2 ) =

92   32+ 32
36 (  1) ;
1
9

: (27)
Here,
D1   D2 =
1
4 (  1) (  2)
2 > 0; for   2c2H , 2 <  < 4. (28)
 Case E: s1 = (+;+); s2 = (+;+)
In case E, both rms produce both products,
(qE1H ; q
E
1L ; q
E
2H ; q
E
2L ) =

+ c2H   3
3(  1) ;
2  c2H
3(  1) ;
  2c2H
3(  1) ;
2c2H   1
3(  1)

(29)
if 1 < c2H < 2 and 3  c2H < ;
where the last inequalities must hold because of both the positive output and the
necessary condition. In addition, we obtain
qE1H R qE1L ,  R 5  2c2H , qE2H R qE1L and qE2L R qE1H ,  S c2H + 2.
Furthermore, we show that
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qE2H R qE2L ,  R 4c2H   1.
In this case, c2H is very small compared with . In Figure 1, this case corresponds to
areas E.1, E.2, E.3, and E.4. Moving from area E.4 to E.1, the relatively ine¢ cient
rm 2 reduces its output of high-quality product H.
Then, we obtain the corresponding equilibrium price and prot of each rm from
(4), (5), and (10):
(pEH ; p
E
L ) =

+ c2H + 1
3
;
1
3

(30)
E1 =
1
9(  1)
 
2 + (2c2H   5)+ (c2H   2)(c2H   4)

,
E2 =
1
9(  1)
 
2   (4c2H   1)+ 4c22H   1

. (31)
For 1 < c2H < 2;   2c2H > 1
2
(c2H + 3),
E1   E2 =
1
3 (  1) (c2H   1) (2  c2H   3) > 0: (32)
By combining these ve cases, we obtain the following proposition. Further, we show
the product line strategy of the duopoly game under the rivals nonnegative output belief
in the c2H- plane in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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Proposition 1 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game, given the rivals expectation
of a nonnegative quantity, the following inequalities hold for the outputs of the high- and
low-quality goods for each rm:
0 < qE2H < q
E
1H  qE1L < qE2L
for (c2H ; ) 2 f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j  > 2c2H ;   5  2c2H and 1 < c2H < 5
4
g (E.1),
0 < qE2H < q
E
1L < q
E
1H < q
E
2L for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j  > 2c2H ;  > 5  2c2H ;  < c2H + 2 and 1 < c2H < 2g (E.2),
0 < qE1L  qE2H < qE2L < qE1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j   c2H + 2;  < 4c2H   1; and 1 < c2H < 2g (E.3),
0 < qE1L < q
E
2L  qE2H < qE1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j   4c2H   1; and 1 < c2H < 2g (E.4).
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qC1L = 0 < q
C
2L < q
C
2H < q
C
1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j  > 1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) > 4; c2H  2g (C.1),
qC1L = 0 < q
C
2H  qC2L < qC1H for (c2H ; ) 2
f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j 1
4
(7c2H +
q
49c22H   8c2H + 16) >  
1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4) > 4
; c2H  2g (C.2).
qB1H  qB2L > qB1L = qB2H = 0
for (c2H ; ) 2 f(c2H ; ) 2 R2++ j 4    1
2
(2c2H +
q
4c22H   2c2H + 4);  
5
2
(B).
qD2L =
1
3
> qD1H > q
D
1L > q
D
2H = 0 when
5
2
<  < 4;   2c2H (D.1),
qD2L =
1
3
> qD1L  qD1H > qD2H = 0 when 1 <  
5
2
;   2c2H ; (D.2).
qA1H = q
A
2H = 0 < q
A
1L = q
A
2L =
1
3
when 1 <   2 (A).
where A, B, C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, E.1, E.2, E.3, and E.4 indicate the area in the c2H-
plane in Figure 1.
Note that each equilibrium output presented in Proposition 1 is that of a duopoly
game, given the rmsexpectations about their rivals nonnegative output(s).
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The result presented in Proposition 1 leads rms to infer correctly the quality su-
periority and relative cost-e¢ ciency ratios ex post by observing the output strategies in
equilibrium. Note that we assume c2H > c1H = 1 and VH = VL =  > VL = 1. Thus, the
horizontal and vertical axes in Figure 1 show the relative cost ratio c2H and the quality
ratio , respectively. At any point (c2H ; ) in areas E.1, E.2, E.3, and E.4 in Figure 1,
the relative cost ratio c2H is between one and two. Thus, the di¤erence between the unit
costs of the two rms is small. The equilibrium in case E corresponds to these areas. In
areas E.1, E.2, and E.3, the relative superiority of the high-quality good  is not very
high. Thus, both rms are likely to supply high- and low-quality goods.
However, as the quality ratio  becomes su¢ ciently high and the relative cost ratio
c2H becomes su¢ ciently low in area E.4, the ine¢ cient rm 2 produces far more of the
high-quality good, which has a higher cost than that of the low-quality good (with no
production cost). Naturally, the e¢ cient rm 1 produces more of the high-quality good H
than of the low-quality good L because its production cost for H is lower than that of the
rival rm; its marginal revenue from good H is also high because its quality superiority
 is very high. From this illustration, we identify a substitution of production from the
low- to the high-quality good in both rms as the point (c2H ; ) moves from area E.1
to areas E.2, E.3, and E.4 in Figure 1. Note that this substitution is stronger for the
e¢ cient than for the ine¢ cient rm.
This result is consistent with that of Calzada and Valletti (2012), where the optimal
strategy for a lm studio is to introduce versioning if their goods are not close substitutes.
Thus, when the quality of the high-quality good H is large compared with that of good
L, we can conclude that they are not close substitutes. Then, the result in the above
proposition conrms that it would be better for both rms to supply both goods in the
market; that is, to obey the versioning strategyof Calzada and Valletti (2012).
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At any point (c2H ; ) in areas C.1 and C.2, the relative superiority  is large compared
with the relative cost ratio c2H . Thus, the margin of the e¢ cient rm 1 for the high-
quality good H, pCH   1 is very high, and the rm substitutes the production of good
L by that of good H. In other words, the e¢ cient rm 1 specializes in good H, with its
relatively large margin compared with that for the low-quality good L (that is pCL ) .
Moving from area C.1 to C.2, the ine¢ cient rm 2 loses its incentive to supply the high-
quality good more because c2H increases but  decreases. Thus, it reduces its output of
the high-quality good and increases its output of the low-quality good. The equilibrium
in case C corresponds to these areas.
In area B, the relative superiority  is at a moderate level, but is smaller than those
in areas C.1 and C.2, and the relative cost ratio c2H is larger than those in areas C.1
and C.2. Hence, rm 2, with its ine¢ cient production technology for the high-quality
good, stops producing good H and specializes in the low-quality good L. Two monopoly
markets appear in this case. The equilibrium in case B corresponds to this area. As the
relative superiority  decreases from the point (c2H ; ) in area D.1 to that in area D.2,
rm 1 with e¢ cient production technology for the high-quality good reduces its output
of good H and increases its output of the low-quality good, thus substituting production
of the high-quality good with that of the low-quality good. As the relative superiority
 decreases further in the equilibrium in case A (area A), rm 1 ceases to produce the
high-quality good H and specializes in the low-quality good. Consequently, the market
in the equilibrium becomes a duopoly of the low-quality good.
Next, we provide a lemma on the equilibrium prots of the rms for the ve nontrivial
equilibria.
Lemma 1 In the duopoly equilibrium of the game under the expectation of the rival
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rms nonnegative quantities, the following equality and inequalities hold for the prots
of each rm:
In case A, the equilibrium prots of both rms are identical: A1 = 
A
2 . In the
equilibria for cases B, C, D, and E, rm 1 which is e¢ cient in producing the high-
quality good earns more than rm 2 which has ine¢ cient technology for producing the
high-quality good. Thus, k1 > 
k
2 , k = B;C;D; and E.
Note that the rm that is cost-e¢ cient in producing the high-quality product earns
more than the ine¢ cient rm does at all equilibria except that of case A.
In case A, taking into account the results of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we nd that
the relative superiority  of the high-quality good is too small compared with the unit
costs for H. Thus, both rms specialize in good L, and the market for good L becomes a
Cournot duopoly. Hence, the two rmsequilibrium prots are identical.
3 Comparative statics of the di¤erence in total equi-
librium outputs and prots based on  and c2H
In this section, we conduct a comparative statics analysis of di¤erences in total outputs
and prots on the two ratios  and c2H in the ve equilibria.
Note that  stands for the relative superiority of the high-quality good, VH=VL =
 > 1 = VL. Let  (c2H) denote the variation of  (c2H).  > (<) 0 implies that
the rmsproduct innovation of the high-quality good succeeds in improving (fails to
improve) the relative superiority of the high-quality good. c2H > (<) 0 implies that the
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process innovation on the high-quality good of the e¢ cient rm 1 (the ine¢ cient rm 2)
succeeds in enhancing the relative cost e¢ ciency of the high-quality good.
First, we investigate how the change of the relative superiority of the high-quality
good  or the relative cost ratio c2H a¤ects the di¤erence in the total output between the
cost-e¢ cient rm 1 and the ine¢ cient rm 2 at equilibrium k(= A;B;C;D;E).
We denote by Qki = q
k
iL+q
k
iH andQ
k
12  Qk1  Qk2 , the total output of rm i(= 1; 2)
and the di¤erence in total output of the high-quality good H between the e¢ cient rm 1
and the ine¢ cient rm 2, respectively, at equilibrium k(= A;B;C;D;E).
From (10), (13), (14), (18), (21), (25), and (29), we see that
QA1 = Q
A
2 =
1
3
;QA12 = 0, (33)
QB1 =
2  3
4  1 ; Q
B
2 =
+ 1
4  1 ;Q
B
12 =
  4
4  1 > 0, (34)
QC1 =
1
3
(+ c2H   2) ; QC2 =
1
6
(2  c2H + 2) ;QC12 =
1
2
(c2H   2) > 0, (35)
QD1 = Q
D
2 =
1
3
;QD12 = 0 (36)
and
QE1 = Q
E
2 =
1
3
;QE12 = 0. (37)
From (33), we see that @
@
QA12 =
@
@c2H
QA12 = 0. From (34), we can easily show that
23
d
d
QB12 > 0 and
@
@c2H
QB12 = 0.
From (35), we see that @
@
QC12  0 for c2H  2 and 12(2c2H+
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) < .
From (36), we have d
d
QD12 = 0,
d
dc2H
QD12 = 0 for 2 <  < 4, since Q
D
12 = 0. From
(37), we obviously see that QE12 = 0,
@
@
QE12 = 0 and
@
@c2H
QE12 = 0.
Next, we investigate the e¤ects of the di¤erence in the prot of the cost e¢ cient
rm 1 and the ine¢ cient rm 2 for the high-quality good H at every equilibrium when
the relative superiority of the high-quality good  and the relative cost ratio c2H of the
high-quality good change.
We denote by k  k1   k2 the di¤erence in the prot of the e¢ cient rm 1 for
the high-quality good H and the ine¢ cient rm 2 at equilibrium k(= A;B;C;D;E).
Because A = 0, we obviously see that @
@
A = @
@c2H
A = 0. From (17), we
have d
d
B = d
d
( 1
4 1 (
2   3+ 1)) > 0 if 1   and @
@c2H
B = 0. From (24), we
can show that @

C > 0 for 2 < c2H ;then @
C = 1
122( 1)2 (c
2
2H   4)(42   2  
1) > 0, and @
@c2H
C = 1
6( 1) (4
2   4 (c2H + 1)+ c2H) > 0 when  > 12(2c2H +p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) > 4.
From (28),D is a function of only  and we can show that d
d
D > 0 ,  > 2
because 2 <  < 4. We have d
dc2H
D = 0. From (32), we can see that @
@
E > 0 and
@
@c2H
E > 0 for  > c2H + 1, 1 < c2H < 2.
In summary, we can obtain the next proposition on the e¤ect of changing Qk12 and
k; k = A;B;C;D;E, when the relative superiority of the high-quality good  and the
relative cost ratio c2H of high-quality good H change. The proof of the lemma is provided
in the appendix.
Lemma 2 At equilibrium A, changing the relative superiority of the high-quality good
 and the relative cost ratio of high-quality good c2H has no e¤ect on QA12 and 
A .
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At equilibria B and D, QB12 , 
B and D increase as the relative superiority of the
high-quality good  increases but QD12 does not change. There is no e¤ect on Q
B
12 ,
QD12 , 
B and D when the relative cost ratio of the high-quality good c2H changes.
At equilibrium C , QC12 nonincreases, but 
C increases as the relative superiority of
the high-quality good  increases. Both QC12 and 
C increase as c2H increases. At
equilibrium E, changing the relative superiority of the high-quality good  and the relative
cost ratio of the high-quality good c2H has no e¤ect on QE12 , but 
E increases as the
relative superiority of the high-quality good  or the relative cost ratio of high-quality good
c2H increases.
Figure 2 graphically summarizes the results in Lemma 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In equilibrium A, the relative superiority of the high-quality good  is too low, so
both rms supply the same output, consisting of only low-quality good L, to the market,
irrespective of the relative cost ratio of the high-quality good c2H . Hence, any change of
 and c2H in area A has no e¤ect on the di¤erence in the total output and prot between
rms, QA12 and 
A.
In equilibrium D, the relative superiority of the high-quality good  is relatively low,
but the relative cost ratio of the high-quality good c2H is not as low. The ine¢ cient rm 2
stops producing the high-quality good and specializes in supplying the low-quality good L,
but the e¢ cient rm 1 supplies high-quality good H to the market, as well as low-quality
good L. Hence,  > 0 in the area D brings about production substitution from the low-
quality good L to the high-quality-good H in rm 1s product line, but there is no change
in rm 2s product line. However, the total output QD1 of rm 1 for both goods L and H
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does not change because they o¤set each other by perfect production substitution from
good L to good H within the e¢ cient rm 1 as  increases. Consequently, if the relative
superiority of the high-quality good  increases, then only D increases but QD12
remains zero. However, c2H has no e¤ect on QD12 and 
D because the ine¢ cient
rm 2 never produces the high-quality good H in equilibrium D.
In equilibrium B, , the relative superiority of the high-quality good is higher and
the relative cost ine¢ ciency c2H is not as high as that in equilibrium D. Hence, rm
1 stops producing the low-quality good L and specializes in producing the high-quality
good H. By contrast, the ine¢ cient rm 2 continues to specialize in producing good L
because its relative cost ine¢ ciency of good H compared with that of rm 1 is strong
in this area. However, when  is su¢ ciently high, rm 1 stops supplying good L and
increases its output of good H, so rm 2 increases its output of good L. The increment in
the former surpasses that of the latter so that QB12 (> 0) is increasing in . In addition,
the di¤erence in the prots of the two rms, Balso increases as  increases because
the markup of the high-quality good H is larger than that of the low-quality good.
In equilibrium C, , the relative superiority of the high-quality good is much higher,
but the relative cost ine¢ ciency c2H is not higher than that in equilibrium B. Therefore,
the e¢ cient rm 1 keeps specializing in supplying good H, but the ine¢ cient rm 2
supplies the high-quality good H, as well as good L, because the margin of good H is
large enough for the ine¢ cient rm 2 to produce good H. The di¤erence in the rms
total output, QC12 , nonincreases (increases) as  (c2H) increases because the decrease in
the output of good H (the total output of rm 1) by rm 1 outweighs the increase of the
resultant total output of rm 2 through the production substitution from good L (H) to
good H (L) in rm 2. As a consequence, the di¤erence in the rmstotal market shares
QC12 shrinks. We can easily conrm these reason by consider reaction functions in case
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C:
q1H =
1
2
  1
2
q2H   1
2
q2L
q2H =
1
2
  1
2
c2H

  1
2
q1H   1

q2L
q2L =
1
2
  1
2
q1H   q2H :
To pay attention to the slope of these reaction functions, an increase in  leads to the
smaller e¤ect of q2L on both (q1H ; q2H) and directly leads to expansion q2H because of
the decrease in cost-quality ratio c2H=. As a result, an increase in  causes to large
increase q2H and to decrease q1H , so that QC12 decreases.
Proposition 2 In a multiproduct duopoly which supplies high-quality goods by both
rms and low-quality goods by only the ine¢ cient rm, an increase in the relative supe-
riority of the high-quality good shrinks the di¤erence in the rmsmarket shares.
The di¤erence in the rmsprots C is increasing (decreasing) in  (c2H) because
the increase of  (c2H) expands (shrinks) the markups from good H of both rms.
In equilibrium E, the relative cost ine¢ ciency c2H is very low. Hence, rm 1 begins
to supply low-quality good L to the market, as well as good H. In this equilibrium,
QE12 = 0 because the production substitution quantities from one good to another
o¤set each other as  (c2H) increases. Note that in equilibrium E, QE1 = Q
E
2 = 1=3,
from (29). This implies that both good H and good L are perfectly substituted in each
rm, so changing  or c2H causes a direct production substitution between good H and
good L within each rm, and subsequently does an indirect production substitution of each
good between the cost-e¢ cient rm 1 and the cost-ine¢ cient rm 2. The former direct
e¤ect, however, works more intensely than the latter. Consequently, the di¤erence in the
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rmsprot E as  (c2H) increases because the increase of both  and c2H enhances
the production substitution from good L to good H in both rms, and e¢ cient rm 1s
markup on good H is larger than that of ine¢ cient rm 2.
4 Welfare Analysis
4.1 The Social Welfare for the Cournot Duopoly Equilibria
In this section, we rst dene social welfare. We then present the social welfare in the
equilibria derived in the preceding section and compare the equilibrium social welfare for
the ve cases. We dene social welfare W k, for k = A;B;C;D, and E, and the social
surplus as the sum of the consumer surplus CSk and the producer surplus PSk:
W k = CSk + PSk; k = A;B;C;D and E.
We dene CSk and PSk as
CSk 
Z bk
k
(   pkL )d +
Z 1
^
k
(   pkH )d
=
1
2
h
+ (1  )(bk)2   (k)2i  pkL (bk   k)  pkH (1  bk) (38)
and
PSk  k1 + k2
= (pkH   ck1H)qk1H + pk1LQk1L + (pkH   ck2H)qk2H + pk2LQk2L. (39)
Then, from (38) and (39), the social surplus is dened as
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W k(^
k
) 
Z ^k
k
d +
Z 1
^
k
d   ciHqkiH   ckjHqkjH (40)
=    1
2

^
k2
+

2
  1
2
(k)2   ciHqkiH   ckjHqkjH ; i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i.
For case A, from (3), (2), (39), (12), (38), and (40), we have
bA = 1; A = pAL = 13 ; CSA =
Z 1
1
3

   1
3

d =
2
9
and
W A(^
A
) = PSA + CSA =
2
9
+
2
9
=
4
9
. (41)
For case B, from (3), (2), (39), (16), (38), and (40), we obtain
bB() = 2(+ 1)
4  1 ; 
B() = P BL () =
+ 1
4  1 ; CS
B =
1
2 (4  1)2
 
43   72 + 9  5
and
W B() =W B(^
B
()) =
1
2 (4  1)2
 
123   292 + 31  3 . (42)
For case C, from (3), (2), (39), (23), (38), and (40), we have
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bC(; c2H) = 1
6(  1)
 
22 + 2c2H+ c2H   2

; CL = P
C
L =
1
6
(2  c2H + 2) ;
CSC(; c2H)  CSC(bC(; c2H))
=
1
72 (  1)
 
163   16(c2H + 2)2 + 4 (c2H + 5) (c2H + 1)+ (5c2H + 2) (c2H   2)

and
W C(; c2H)  W C(^C(; c2H))
=
1
72 (  1)(32
3   32(c2H + 2)2 + 4(11c22H   6c2H + 19)
  (17c2H   22) (c2H   2)): (43)
For case D, from (3), (2), (39), (27), (38), and (40), we have
bD() = 1
2

  1 ; 
D
L = P
D
L =
1
3
; CSD =
1
72 (  1)
 
92   20+ 20 ;
W D(^
D
()) =
1
72 (  1)
 
272   76+ 76 . (44)
For case E, from (3), (2), (39), (31), (38), and (40), we have
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bE(; c2H) = 1
3  3 (+ c2H) ; 
E = pEL =
1
3
;
CSE(; c2H)  CSE(bE(; c2H))
=
1
18 (  1)
 
42   4(c2H + 2)+ (c2H + 5) (c2H + 1)

;
W E(; c2H)  W E(^E(; c2H))
=
1
18 (  1)
 
82   8(c2H + 2)+ (11c22H   6c2H + 19

). (45)
In observing the nonnegativity conditions for the equilibrium outputs of these four
equilibria, (10), (25), (14), and (20), we can ensure that the value of the upper bound of
the condition in case A is exactly the same as that of the lower bound in case D, that of
the upper bound in case D is also the same as that of the lower bound in case B, and so
on.
Hence, we obtain the following proposition on the equilibrium welfare in the ve cases.
The proof is in the appendix.
Lemma 3
d
d
W D() > 0 for 2 <  < 4 in case D. d
d
W B() > 0 for 4    1
2
(2c2H +p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) in case B. @@W C(; c2H) > 0 for 12(2c2H +
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4) <
, 2  c2H ; @@c2HW C(; c2H) > 0 for c2H  2, 12(2 +
p
4c22H   2c2H + 4)   <
11
8
c2H +
1
8
p
121c22H   134c2H + 121   38 ; @@c2HW C(; c2H)  0 for c2H  2, 118 c2H + 18p
121c22H   134c2H + 121  38   in case C. @@W E(; c2H) > 0 for 1 < c2H < 2,  > 2,
c2H > 2. @@c2HW
E(; c2H) > 0 for 14(11c2H   3) >  > 2c2H , @@c2HW E(; c2H)  0 for
2c2H <
1
4
(11c2H   3)   in case E.
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Figure 3 graphically summarizes the results in Lemma 3.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
An increase in the relative superiority of the high-quality good  leads to an increase
in the equilibrium output of good H in the market. This increases both: (i) the sum of
consumerswillingness-to-pay (positive e¤ect on welfare), @
R ^k
k d +
R 1
^
k d

=@;
and (ii) the rms relative production costs (negative e¤ect on welfare),  ciH(@qkiH=@) 
ckjH(@q
k
jH=@), from (40). Lemma 3 implies that the direct e¤ect (i) is stronger than the
indirect e¤ect (ii), so that the increase in  improves social welfare.
Furthermore, in two cases, C and E, the marginal cost of good H for rm 2 impacts
the social welfare because rm 2 produces good H in these cases. Lemma 3 means that
with these combinations of the product line, social welfare is convex in c2H . Namely, in
Figure 3, the light blue dottd line stands for  = 11
8
c2H +
1
8
p
121c22H   134c2H + 121  38
in case C and the green dotted line indicates  = 1
4
(11c2H   3) in case E, respectively.
The social welfare in this model consists of: (a) the sum of consumers willingness-
to-pay, (b) the production cost of good H for rm 1 (c1H = 1), and (c) the production
cost of good H for rm 2 (c2H > 1 = c1H).
 (a) The sum of consumerswillingness-to-pay (indirect e¤ect)
@
R ^C
C d +
R 1
^
C d

@c2H
=
4  222 + 183   c2H(5 + 4)
36(  1) ;
@
R ^E
E d +
R 1
^
E d

@c2H
=
 (+ c2H)
9(  1) < 0:
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In case C, this positively (negatively) a¤ects the social welfare if c2H is su¢ ciently
small (large), whereas it always negatively a¤ects the social welfare in case E.
 (b) The production cost of good H for rm 1 (indirect e¤ect)
@( qC1H)
@c2H
=
 1
3(  1) < 0;
@( qE1H)
@c2H
=
 1
3
< 0:
These negatively a¤ect the social welfare.
 (c) The production cost of good H for rm 2 (direct e¤ect)
@( c2HqC2H)
@c2H
=
1  2 + c2H(4  1)
3(  1) ;
@( c2HqE2H)
@c2H
=
4c2H   
3(  1) :
In both cases, this negatively (positively) a¤ects the social welfare if c2H is su¢ -
ciently small (large).
This implies that, in both cases (C and E), the direct e¤ect of c2H (the third factors)
is stronger than any other e¤ects; that is, the social welfareW C(; c2H) andW E(; c2H)
decrease (increase) in c2H when c2H is small (large) enough from Lemma 3. Thus, the
social welfare in these cases is a convex function in c2H .3 For these two cases, we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In the multiproduct Cournot duopoly equilibria C and E, a reduction in
the relative cost ine¢ ciency can decrease social welfare. This may occur even when both
rms have an equal market share of the total output of the two goods, but the ine¢ cient
rm in production has a lesser market share of the high-quality good H than the e¢ cient
rm.
3The result of case E corresponds to Proposition 5 in Kitamura and Shinkai (2015b).
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In Figure 3, in the equilibrium of both cases, social welfare has the tendency to
decrease (increase) when c2H decreases, if  is su¢ ciently small (large) in case E or if
c2H is su¢ ciently large (small) in case C. The reason is that in case E, a decrease in
the relatively high (low)-cost good H for rm 2 makes the ine¢ cient rm 2 substitute
production from good L to good H within rm 2. It then causes the e¢ cient rm 1s
production substitution from good H to good L between rm 1 and rm 2, and that makes
social welfare worse. In case C, when c2H is su¢ ciently large, social welfare becomes worse
as c2H falls because of the production substitution between the two rms for the high-
quality good; that is, the relatively ine¢ cient rm 2 sells more good H and e¢ cient rm
1 sells less H.
Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that, in a single-product Cournot oligopoly, reducing
the marginal cost of a minor rm with a su¢ ciently low share can decrease welfare by
the production substitution. Moreover, they nd that if all the rms have an equal
market share, then a cost reduction in any rm improves social welfare. In case C, from
proposition 2, QC12 increases when  is small or c2H is large, so that the market share
of ine¢ cient rm 2 decreases as c2H decreases. In this case, whereas Proposition 3 states
the same result as Lahiri and Ono (1988), the cause of our result di¤ers from theirs.
Our result is caused by both a stronger production substitution from good L to good H
within rm 2 and, subsequently, a weaker production substitution of good H between
the cost-e¢ cient and cost-ine¢ cient rm by means of a strategic substitute, from (18) as
large c2H decreases.
However, Lahiri and Onos (1988) result is only caused by the production substitution
between the cost-e¢ cient and cost-ine¢ cient rm as the ine¢ cient rms cost decreases.
Meanwhile, in case E, QE12 = 0 means that the two rms have the same market share
for the total output of the two goods, but the ine¢ cient rm 2 in production of the
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high-quality good has less market share for high-quality good H than the e¢ cient rm 1
does. In this case, Proposition 3 in our model states that a cost reduction can decrease
social welfare, even though both rms have the same market share for total outputs; that
is, QE1 = Q
E
2 = 1=3, from (37). This implies that both goods H and L are perfectly
substituted in each rm, so the changing  or c2H causes not only production substitution
between good H and good L within each rm, but also the production substitution of
each good between the two rms.
We account for the mechanism of how reducing the relative marginal cost ine¢ ciency
decreases social welfare. In the equilibrium that we derive , both goods H and L are per-
fectly substituted in each rm. Therefore, changing  or c2H causes not only production
substitution between good H and good L within each rm, but also the production sub-
stitution of each good between the two rms. This occurs because we consider a model in
which each rm can a¤ord to produce and supply vertically-di¤erentiated multiproducts.
However, Lahiri and Onos (1988) result is caused only by the production outputs of each
good between the cost-e¤ective and cost-ine¤ective rm because they consider a model
in which rms can supply a homogeneous single product, but rms have asymmetric
production costs.
4.2 The Social Welfare for the First Best Equilibria
In this subsection, we would like to consider the rst-best equilibrium in which the social
planner can choose the quantities of all goods for maximizing the social welfare dened
by (3), (4), and (40) under nonnegative constraints of outputs of goods:
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max
q1H ;q2H ;q1L;q2L
W (q1H ; q2H ; q1L; q2L) =
1
2
[ (1  q1H   q2H)2 + + 2(1  q1H   q2H)(q1L + q2L)
 (q1L + q2L)2]  q1H   c2Hq2H
subject to q1H ; q2H ; q1L; q2L  0:
Then, we can easily calculate and identify the following six cases that satisfy the
KuhnTucker condition for the above maximization problem:
 Case 1: s1 = (0;+); s2 = (0; 0) if 1 <   2.
Then, we have (qF11H ; q
F1
1L ; q
F1
2H ; q
F1
2L ) = (0; 1; 0; 0).
 Case 2: s1 = (0; 0); s2 = (0;+) if 1 <   2.
Then, we have (qF21H ; q
F2
1L ; q
F2
2H ; q
F2
2L ) = (0; 0; 0; 1).
 Case 3: s1 = (0;+); s2 = (0;+) if 1 <   2.
Then, we have (qF31H ; q
F3
1L ; q
F3
2H ; q
F3
2L ) = (0; q
F3
1L ; 0; q
F3
2L ) and
qF31L + q
F3
2L = 1.
 Case 4: s1 = (+;+); s2 = (0; 0) if 2 < .
Then, we have (qF41H ; q
F4
1L ; q
F4
2H ; q
F4
2L ) = ((  2)=(  1); 1=(  1); 0; 0).
 Case 5: s1 = (+; 0); s2 = (0;+) if 2 < .
Then, we have (qF51H ; q
F5
1L ; q
F5
2H ; q
F5
2L ) = ((  2)=(  1); 0; 0; 1=(  1)).
 Case 6: s1 = (+;+); s2 = (0;+) if 2 < .
Then, we have (qF61H ; q
F6
1L ; q
F6
2H ; q
F6
2L ) = ((  2)=(  1); qF61L ; 0; qF62L ) and
qF61L + q
F6
2L = 1=(  1).
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According to the above result, in our model, the social planner does not let the ine¢ -
cient rm produce the high-quality good. The resultant outcomes in cases 1 and 2 above
are a monopoly for good L of an e¢ cient rm 1 and an ine¢ cient rm 2, respectively.
The outcome in case 3 is a duopoly for good L. The outcomes in cases 4 and 5 are a
monopoly for both goods and a monopoly specializing in good H for cost-e¢ cient rm
1, and a monopoly specializing in good L for cost-ine¢ cient rm 2, respectively. The
outcome in case 6 is a monopoly for good H for cost e¢ cient rm 1 in good H and a
duopoly in good L. We can easily nd that the social surpluses are all the same in the
rst-best equilibria for cases 1, 2, and 3 , thus we have
W Fi(qFi1H ; q
Fi
1L ; q
Fi
2H ; q
Fi
2L ) =
1
2
; i = 1; 2; 3. (46)
We can also derive the social surpluses in cases 4, 5, and 6,
W Fi(qFi1H ; q
Fi
1L ; q
Fi
2H ; q
Fi
2L ) =
1
2(  1)(
2   3+ 3); i = 4; 5; 6. (47)
Comparing the resultant product lines for both goods with positive production out-
puts for both rms in the rst-best equilibrium with those in the Cournot competition
equilibrium derived in Section 2, we see that case 3, the case 5 equilibrium, and case 6 in
the rst-best equilibria correspond to case A, the case B equilibrium, and case D in the
Cournot competition equilibria, respectively. Examining the properties of the di¤erences
between the social surplus in all cases given by (46) and (47) in the rst-best equilibrium
and those corresponding to all ve cases in the Cournot duopoly equilibrium, we conclude
the following.4
Proposition 4 In the multiproduct Cournot duopoly equilibria B, C, D, and E, an
4For the proof, see Appendix.
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increase in the relative superiority of the high-quality good brings about greater market
ine¢ ciency.
If  < 2, which corresponds to the case A in the Cournot duopoly equilibrium,
then only the low-quality good is supplied in both the rst-best equilibrium and the
Cournot duopoly equilibrium, so that the change of  does not a¤ect social welfare. If
  2, then in the rst-best equilibrium, the social planner can make the e¢ cient rm
produce the high-quality good and both rms produce the low-quality good optimally
when  increases. In the Cournot duopoly, however, such optimal allocation is not realized
because of the competition between these rms. Specically, in cases B and D, the
increase in  leads to the e¢ cient rm producing more high-quality goods, but this is
underproduction from a social perspective: @QFiH =@ > @Q
B
H =@ and @Q
Fi
H =@ >
@QDH =@. Therefore, the increase in  brings about greater market ine¢ ciency in cases
B and D in the Cournot duopoly equilibrium. In cases C and E, the ine¢ cient rm also
produces the high-quality good, so that the increase in  induces the ine¢ cient rm to
produce more of the high-quality good, which increases the market ine¢ ciency.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we consider a duopoly game with two vertically-di¤erentiated products un-
der nonnegative output constraints and an expectation with regard to the rivals product
line strategies. We derive an equilibrium for the game and describe the rmsproduct line
strategies and their realized prots in each equilibrium, based on the quality superiority
of the goods and the relative cost e¢ ciency.
We also show that the cost-e¢ cient rm producing the high-quality good earns more
than the ine¢ cient rm, except in the special case where the relative superiority of the
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high-quality good  is too small compared with the unit cost of the high-quality good
H. In this case, both rms specialize in good L, and the market for good L becomes
a Cournot duopoly. Thus, both rmsprots are the same. We also show that social
welfare increases as the relative superiority of the high-quality good  increases in all ve
cases.
However, in cases C and E, where the ine¢ cient rm 2 produces good H, social
welfare is convex in the relative cost ine¢ ciency of good H, c2H . Thus, in a multiproduct
Cournot duopoly, a reduction in the relative marginal cost ine¢ ciency decreases social
welfare, whereas Lahiri and Ono (1988) obtain a similar result in a single-product Cournot
oligopoly. We also illustrate that the mechanism for our result di¤ers from that of Lahiri
and Ono (1988). Our result is caused by both a stronger production substitution from
good L to good H within rm 2 and, subsequently, a weaker production substitution
of good H between the cost-e¢ cient and cost-ine¢ cient rms by means of a strategic
substitute, from (18) as the large c2H decreases (in equilibria C and E). However, the
result of Lahiri and Ono (1988) is only caused by the production substitution between
the cost-e¢ cient and cost-ine¢ cient rms as the cost of the ine¢ cient rm decreases.
In addition, we clarify how the mechanism by which our result is caused is di¤erent
from that for the result in Lahiri and Ono (1988). In equilibria C and E in our study, both
goods H and L are perfectly substituted in each rm, so changing  or c2H causes not
only the production substitution between good H and good L within each rm, but also
the production substitution of each good between the two rms. This occurs because
we consider a model in which each rm can a¤ord to produce and supply vertically-
di¤erentiated multiproducts. By contrast, the result in Lahiri and Ono (1988) is caused
only by the production substitution of the goods between the cost-e¤ective rm and
the cost-ine¤ective rm because they only consider a model in which rms supply a
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homogeneous single product, but the rms have asymmetric production costs.
Finally, we derive six rst-best equilibria in which the social planner can choose the
quantities of all goods for maximizing social welfare under nonnegative constraints of the
outputs of goods. By comparing the social welfare in the rst-best equilibria with those
in the Cournot duopoly equilibria, we show that an increase in the relative superiority of
the high-quality good makes the social welfare of the market worse in the multiproduct
Cournot duopoly equilibria B, C, D, and E.
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Figure 3 Welfare Comparison and Comparative Statics on   and 2Hc  
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